▼ A large body of literature emphasizes the importance of limiting opportunities for manipulation of legislative institutions by self-interested actors. We show that the very conditions ensuring immunity to manipulation by those who control the agenda-setting process also render policymaking environments highly vulnerable to capture by special interests. This result holds in a highly general dynamic framework that encompasses a broad range of empirically relevant agenda institutions and policy environments, possibly involving uncertainty and experimentation. [Less]

▼ We consider a cooperative game in which multiple companies can pool their service capacities to reduce overall costs. Customer types, each affiliated with a company, have heterogeneous service time requirements and the only concern of customers is their expected waiting times. We impose a general performance constraint: the maximum mean waiting time for any customer in the queue not exceed a common bound. [Less]

▼ Housing is a critical determinant of both individual livelihoods and broader economic development. In the context of China’s evolving socio-economic landscape, housing policy should be anchored in three main principles: (i) recognizing the commodity nature of housing within a well-regulated market framework; (ii) prioritizing its residential function as a means of securing basic living conditions; and (iii) maintaining a market-oriented reform path supported by effective state governance. To translate this philosophy into practice, policy efforts should focus on deepening systemic reform, strengthening the legal and regulatory infrastructure, curbing speculative activity, promoting the development of a robust rental housing market, and fostering the integration of urban and rural housing systems. [Less]